Normative uncertainty as a voting problem

Abstract

We often face uncertainty about the right course of action, whether it’s prioritizing distant strangers over family, determining the moral status of embryos, or justifying the use of animal products. This uncertainty can stem from empirical unknowns, like the extent of animal suffering or the effectiveness of aid to distant populations. However, it can also arise from fundamental normative uncertainty, where we lack knowledge about the relative moral weight of different beings or the moral status of non-human animals. This thesis explores the neglected question of how to navigate such normative uncertainty in decision-making. It proposes “metanormativism,” arguing that second-order norms guide action based on a decision-maker’s uncertainty about first-order moral claims. This view suggests maximizing expected choice-worthiness, treating normative uncertainty like empirical uncertainty. The thesis then examines the implications of metanormativism for other philosophical issues, including the theory of rational action with incomparable values, the causal/evidential debate in decision theory, and the value of moral philosophy research.