Rights, utility, and universalization

J. L. Mackie

In R. G. Frey (ed.) Utility and rights, Minneapolis, 1984, pp. 86–105

Abstract

This article explores the contrast between utilitarianism and right-based theories in ethics and political philosophy. The article argues that utilitarianism, which aggregates the interests or preferences of individuals, fails to adequately respect the separateness of persons. Right-based theories, in contrast, emphasize the importance of protecting the separate interests of each individual, beyond merely counting them in a utilitarian calculus. The author proposes a right-based framework that includes basic abstract rights, such as the right to life, health, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, as well as rights related to property and reasonable expectations. The article challenges Hare’s preference-utilitarianism, arguing that his method of universalization does not provide unequivocal support for utilitarianism and can instead be interpreted to support a right-based approach. Finally, the article proposes alternative methods of critical moral thinking, suggesting that moral thinking should resemble the processes by which practical working moralities have actually developed, rather than being guided by a detached utilitarian calculation. – AI-generated abstract.

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A prescriptively universalizing (and therefore utilitarian) critical thinker would encourage the adoption and development of firm principles and dispositions of the ordinary moral sort, rather than the direct use of utilitarian calculation as a practical working morality. There are at least six reasons why this is so. Shortage of time and energy will in general preclude such calculations. Even if time and energy are available, the relevant information commonly is not. An agent’s judgment on particular issues is liable to be distorted by his own interests and special affections. Even if he were intellectually able to determine the right choice, weakness of will would be likely to impair his putting of it into effect. Even decisions that are right in themselves and actions based on them are liable to be misused as precedents, so that they will encourage and seem to legitimate wrong actions that are superficially similar to them. And, human nature being what it is, a practical working morality must not be too demanding: it is worse than useless to set standards so high that there is no real chance that actions will even approximate to them. Considerations of these sorts entail that a reasonable utilitarian critical thinker would recommend the adoption of fairly strict principles and the development of fairly firm dispositions in favor of honesty, veracity, agreement-keeping, justice, fairness, respect for various rights of individuals, gratitude to benefactors, special concern for some individuals connected in certain ways with the agent, and so on, as being more likely in general to produce behavior approximating to that which would be required by the utilitarian ideal than any other humanly viable working morality.