Death and the Value of Life

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of how to account for the fact that death is something to be feared, despite arguments by philosophers like Epicurus who claim that the cessation of consciousness at death entails that it cannot be bad for those who die. The author argues that Epicurus’ reasoning is valid, but that it leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that continuing to live can be good, even if death is not bad. The author proposes an alternative explanation for the badness of death based on the deprivation of potential future goods, but argues that this raises problems when considering deaths that are causally overdetermined by other life-limiting factors. The author suggests a solution to this problem and further refines the account of the badness of death to account for psychological connectedness. Finally, the author acknowledges a paradoxical implication of this account and proposes a way of resolving it. – AI-generated abstract.