Killing, letting die, and withdrawing aid

Jeff McMahan

Ethics, vol. 103, no. 2, 1993, pp. 250–279

Abstract

This article discusses two distinctions within common morality: that between killing and letting die and the implicit wider distinction between doing and allowing. The definitions and existence of these distinctions are explored, and a proposal is made for how to distinguish between killing and letting die in cases involving withdrawing aid or protection. This proposal holds that withdrawing aid or protection counts as killing if the aid or protection was operative, complete, and self-sustaining, while withdrawing aid or protection counts as letting die if the aid or protection was in progress and required further contributions from the agent for it to be effective. This proposal is complicated somewhat by the fact that there are numerous factors that may affect the moral status of a course of conduct that has lethal consequences, in addition to the distinction between killing and letting die. – AI-generated abstract.

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Quotes from this work

[I]t is difficult to believe that the way in which an agent is instrumental in the occurrence of an outcome could be more important than the nature of the outcome itself. Consider the value of an entire human life—of all the good that the life contains. Now suppose that one must choose between killing one person to save two and allowing the two to die. Is it really credible to suppose that how one acts on that single occasion matters more in moral terms than the whole of the life that will be lost if one lets the two die rather than killing the one?

doing and allowing
p. 279