An introduction to contemporary metaethics

Abstract

Metaethics investigates second-order questions concerning the semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of moral discourse, distinguishing itself from the first-order inquiries of normative ethics. The contemporary field is structured by the tension between the apparent objectivity of moral claims and the naturalistic constraints of modern ontology. G.E. Moore’s open-question argument establishes a primary critique of naturalism, suggesting that moral properties are non-natural and irreducible. In response, non-cognitivist frameworks such as emotivism, quasi-realism, and norm-expressivism interpret moral judgements not as truth-apt descriptions, but as expressions of sentiments or commitments to norms, while seeking to account for the propositional surface of ethical language. Error-theoretic approaches maintain that moral judgements are truth-apt yet systematically false, as they falsely presuppose the existence of metaphysically “queer” objective values. Naturalistic cognitivism attempts to resolve these problems by identifying moral properties with natural properties, either through the explanatory efficacy of non-reductive natural kinds or via synthetic reductive identities. Finally, contemporary non-naturalist realism rejects both non-cognitivism and naturalism, situating moral requirements within a “second nature” accessible through proper acculturation rather than standard scientific inquiry. These competing positions seek to reconcile the internalist link between moral judgement and motivation with a plausible account of how moral facts fit into the natural world. – AI-generated abstract.