Beneficence, duty and distance

Abstract

Peter Singer’s Principle of Sacrifice dictates that we should prevent something bad from happening without sacrificing anything morally significant. This, Singer argues, leads to a radical conclusion: everyone has a duty to refrain from spending money on luxuries and use the savings to help those in dire need. The author argues that Singer’s derivation misconstrues ordinary morality. The author argues for a less demanding principle of general beneficence, the Principle of Sympathy, which regulates our duty to give to others according to the impact of our choices on our own lives. The Principle of Sympathy allows for the enjoyment of luxuries, so long as this does not put one at a significant risk of worsening one’s life. The author claims that this principle is compatible with equal respect for all, and addresses Singer’s powerful argument for universal beneficence based on the case of a drowning toddler. While the author acknowledges that we have a duty to rescue those in imminent peril encountered close at hand, the Principle of Nearby Rescue, he argues, is not a consequence of a demanding principle of general beneficence, but rather a result of a special responsiveness to urgent peril encountered close by. The author goes on to suggest that global relationships between affluent people in developed countries and needy people in developing countries may generate obligations to transfer benefits beyond what is demanded by the Principle of Sympathy. – AI-generated abstract.