works
Piers Millett and Andrew Snyder-Beattie Existential risk and cost-effective biosecurity article In the coming decades, advanced bio-engineered weapons could threaten human existence. Although the probability of human extinction from bio-agents may be low, preventing the worst-case scenarios may be more cost-effective than investing in smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. Our results suggest that we are better off focusing on low-impact, high-consequence risks than low-impact, high-impact risks. Cost-effectively bio-securing is a critically underdeveloped area of research, for which there is likely low-cost, high-yield interventions. By reprioritizing current approaches, we place extraordinary weight on avoiding arms races or the widespread weaponization of bio-technology. These suggestions may substantially reduce the possibility of existential risk from bio-tech in the 21st century. – AI-generated abstract.

Existential risk and cost-effective biosecurity

Piers Millett and Andrew Snyder-Beattie

Health security, vol. 15, no. 4, 2017, pp. 373–383

Abstract

In the coming decades, advanced bio-engineered weapons could threaten human existence. Although the probability of human extinction from bio-agents may be low, preventing the worst-case scenarios may be more cost-effective than investing in smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. Our results suggest that we are better off focusing on low-impact, high-consequence risks than low-impact, high-impact risks. Cost-effectively bio-securing is a critically underdeveloped area of research, for which there is likely low-cost, high-yield interventions. By reprioritizing current approaches, we place extraordinary weight on avoiding arms races or the widespread weaponization of bio-technology. These suggestions may substantially reduce the possibility of existential risk from bio-tech in the 21st century. – AI-generated abstract.

PDF

First page of PDF