Review of Carlos Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy
Review of Carlos Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy, no. 144, 2001, pp. 0–1
Abstract
Democratic deliberation is justified by its epistemic capacity to identify morally correct solutions more reliably than alternative political arrangements. This superiority is rooted in the “moralization of preferences,” where inter-subjective discussion encourages participants to shift from selfish to impartial decision-making. The deliberative process offers two distinct epistemic advantages: it enables the accurate representation of diverse social interests that a centralized authority cannot fully grasp, and it facilitates the detection of factual or logical errors through the requirement of public justification. In this context, constitutional practice functions as a collective historical project, similar to a multi-generational architectural endeavor, which judges and legislators are tasked with preserving to maintain the conditions essential for democratic discourse. Judicial review is thus legitimate specifically when it serves to safeguard these foundational procedural requirements. Although the quality of deliberation is significantly hindered by systemic poverty and inequality, institutional reforms—such as transitioning from presidential to parliamentary systems—can enhance the rigor of political debate by prioritizing substantive policy discussion over emotive appeals. The effectiveness of this model rests on the identification of moral truth with impartiality, positioning deliberative democracy as the primary mechanism for accessing ethical knowledge. – AI-generated abstract.
