The Rawls-Harsanyi dispute: a moral point of view

Abstract

The dispute regarding whether the original position justifies Rawlsian principles of justice or the average utility principle is frequently mischaracterized as a technical disagreement over the application of normative decision theory. However, the conflict originates from fundamentally different moral ideals and their formal representations. Rawls’s non-probabilistic framework models autonomy, reciprocity, and impartiality, whereas Harsanyi’s equiprobability model enforces the ideal of impersonality by aggregating individual utilities. The prohibition or inclusion of specific probability assignments in these models is a foundational question of political philosophy rather than a mere decision-theoretic error. Rawls’s rejection of the equiprobability assumption is a deliberate moral choice intended to protect the separateness of persons, while Harsanyi’s reliance on it reflects a utilitarian commitment to impersonal social interest. Consequently, neither framework emerges as a definitive winner; rather, the dispute clarifies the specific moral assumptions—such as the distinction between impartiality and impersonality—that must be accepted to justify either contractualist or utilitarian principles. Recognizing that formal methods alone cannot ground the demands of justice reveals that the selection of a decision rule depends on the prior justification of the moral ideals it is designed to represent. – AI-generated abstract.