Because it feels good: A Hedonistic Theory of Intrinsic Value

Abstract

Hedonism identifies pleasure as the sole intrinsic value and pain as the sole intrinsic disvalue. Although frequently dismissed in contemporary ethics, the theory is supported by a robust internal logic that addresses phenomenal heterogeneity through dimensionalism. Under this view, pleasure and pain represent opposite poles of a single hedonic dimension along which all experiences vary, ensuring both their qualitative unity and quantitative commensurability. The apparent plurality of values is resolved by the cluster challenge, which observes that non-hedonic goods—such as knowledge, freedom, and virtue—consistently function as instrumental means to hedonic ends. Value monism is further reinforced by the nominal-notable commensuration principle, which suggests a unified scale where large amounts of any value can outweigh small amounts of another. This hedonistic framework remains resilient against evolutionary and anti-realist critiques; while natural selection explains the biological function of hedonic signals, it does not negate the intrinsic value of the felt experiences themselves. By distinguishing between life as a standard for practical reasoning and happiness as the ultimate purpose of existence, hedonism provides a comprehensive account of value that is compatible with naturalism and resistant to classical objections like the experience machine or the open question argument. – AI-generated abstract.