The semantics of existence

Abstract

The verb exist functions in natural language as a first-order extensional predicate rather than a second-order or intensional expression. This semantic framework applies uniformly to singular terms, intentional objects, and kinds. Existence statements remain distinct from quantificational there-sentences, as the former relate entities to worlds and times according to their specific ontological categories. In negative existentials, apparently empty terms refer to intentional objects constituted by failed or pretend intentionality, allowing for a consistent first-order treatment without recourse to external negation or reference failure. When applied to bare plurals and mass nouns, the predicate targets kinds, triggering either existential quantification over instances or expressing instance-distribution properties. This episodic nature contrasts with the adjective real, which behaves as a characterizing predicate typically associated with sortal nouns. Furthermore, existence statements involving definite plurals rely on distributive plural reference, suggesting that exist predicates of individuals within a plurality rather than of a single collective entity. These linguistic properties demonstrate that the semantics of existence is systematic and aligns with independently motivated generalizations across natural language. – AI-generated abstract.