Is existence a predicate?
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, vol. 15, no. 1, 1936, pp. 175–188
Abstract
The proposition that existence is not a logical predicate requires a distinction between the grammatical function of “exists” and its logical status as an attribute. In general propositions such as “Tame tigers exist,” the verb functions as an assertion that a propositional function is instantiated rather than as an attribute of individuals. This is demonstrated by the logical asymmetry between existence and standard predicates; while “Some tame tigers do not growl” is significant, “Some tame tigers do not exist” is nonsensical if the meaning of “exist” remains constant. In these instances, existence is a property of the class or function rather than the individuals. Nevertheless, singular existential propositions of the form “This exists” appear significant when referring to objects of perception or sense-data. Because it is logically possible that a specific sense-datum might not have existed, the assertion of its actuality must be meaningful. This suggests that in singular cases involving direct acquaintance, existence may function as an attribute, contradicting the view that it is exclusively a property of propositional functions. – AI-generated abstract.
