Ethics

Abstract

The moral rightness of voluntary actions depends fundamentally on the intrinsic value of their actual consequences. A specific action is right if, and only if, no alternative action available to the agent would have produced total results with greater intrinsic value. This consequentialist framework persists independently of the agent’s motives or the inherent nature of the act. Intrinsic value is an objective property of states of affairs; while pleasure is a common constituent of good wholes, it is not the sole measure of value. Pluralistic goods such as knowledge and aesthetic appreciation possess intrinsic value that is not strictly proportional to the quantity of pleasure they provide. Moral judgments constitute objective propositions rather than mere expressions of subjective feelings, social approvals, or psychological desires. Subjective definitions of moral terms are logically untenable because they fail to account for the existence of genuine moral disagreement. Furthermore, moral obligation is conceptually distinct from psychological states, though the assertion that an agent ought to have acted differently implies they would have done so had they willed it. Ethics functions as an autonomous discipline investigating the objective characteristics of outcomes and the necessary relations between intrinsic goodness and duty. – AI-generated abstract.