Practical rationality and preference: Essays for David Gauthier

Abstract

Traditional choice theory posits that rational action maximizes individual preference satisfaction, yet this model frequently struggles to account for stable cooperation and long-term commitment. David Gauthier’s framework of constrained maximization addresses these theoretical tensions by proposing that rational agents can adopt dispositions to cooperate when doing so secures mutual advantage. Critical examinations of this position reveal fundamental disagreements regarding the metaphysical and logical status of preferences. One central debate concerns whether preferences are mere behavioral dispositions or normatively laden commitments requiring propositional content. Furthermore, the reduction of practical reason to subjective preference is challenged by the argument that preferences themselves presuppose independent standards of what an agent has reason to do. Challenges to instrumentalism suggest that acting on commitments often appears irrational within standard maximization models, necessitating theories of “resolute choice” or the recognition of social practices as autonomous justificatory structures. The psychological and evolutionary conditions for cooperation further complicate the individualist paradigm, suggesting that rational interaction depends on shared cultural heuristics and strategic communication rather than isolated calculation. Finally, the assumption of a unified, self-interested agent is contested by perspectives emphasizing fragmented selfhood and the non-instrumental value of social bonds. Together, these inquiries interrogate the limits of preference-based models in explaining the normative force of rules, intentions, and morality in human interaction. – AI-generated abstract.