What is so good about moral freedom?

Abstract

The writer looks at the dilemma raised by the issue of moral freedom for Christians. He explains that many Christian philosophers believe that human moral freedom is a great good but that because God is essentially good in every possible world, and therefore unable to choose between good and evil, God is not “morally free.” He states that it is not easy to reconcile both of these theses into a single coherent package. He looks at the strategy that appears to offer the best chance of reconciling the doctrine of God’s esse 2710 ntial goodness with the requirements of the free will defense. He states that according to this strategy, moral responsibility in human beings requires freedom to choose between good and evil, whereas God can be morally responsible for his choices without such a freedom. He contends, however, that this strategy fails because it makes God neither responsible for nor identical with his nature, with the result that he is “subject” to his nature in the same way as we are subject to ours. He concludes that such theists as Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne must therefore choose between the doctrine of essential goodness and the defense of free will.