Future people

Abstract

Intergenerational ethics requires a moral framework capable of addressing the impact of current decisions on persons whose identity and existence are contingent upon those very choices. Conventional person-affecting theories and contractarian models struggle with the Non-Identity Problem, often failing to generate robust obligations toward future generations when those individuals cannot be said to have been harmed by actions necessary for their existence. Conversely, simple act-consequentialism imposes extreme, counter-intuitive demands that eliminate reproductive freedom. A moderate consequentialist approach, primarily utilizing rule consequentialism, resolves these tensions by grounding morality in a system of rules that maximize value while respecting human autonomy and psychological limitations. Central to this account is a value theory distinguishing between physiological needs and chosen goals, utilizing context-dependent lexical thresholds to define a life worth living. This framework supports a prima facie right to reproductive freedom and identifies specific parental obligations within a broader theory of justice. By shifting from individual to collective assessment, the model justifies accumulation for future benefit and environmental conservation without necessitating total self-sacrifice. Furthermore, the integration of international justice addresses the complexities of partial compliance and the historical connections that intensify obligations across borders. Ultimately, a combined consequentialist model provides a principled method for balancing the competing interests of present individuals, their descendants, and distant strangers. – AI-generated abstract.