The Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory

Abstract

This article defends the “Simple Desire-Fulfillment” (DF) theory of well-being, arguing that an agent’s well-being is constituted by the obtaining of states of affairs desired by that agent. The article challenges the more common “Knowledge-Modified” DF theory, which posits that well-being is constituted by the satisfaction of desires the agent would have in a hypothetical situation of full information. The author argues that the Knowledge-Modified DF theory relies on two flawed rationales: (1) that desires based on false beliefs are irrelevant to well-being, and (2) that desires absent due to a lack of true beliefs are also irrelevant. The author argues that the first rationale is mistaken because there is a principled account of how the Simple DF theory can account for desires based on false beliefs, and that the second rationale is mistaken because there is no reason to discount the contribution of a desire to an agent’s well-being merely because it was caused by a false belief. The article concludes that the Simple DF theory is the superior version of DF theory because it offers a more straightforward and plausible account of well-being, and because there is no principled basis for moving from a Simple to a Knowledge-Modified version of the theory. – AI-generated abstract