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Liam Murphy Concepts of law article The boundary between law and morality remains a central point of contention in legal philosophy, as traditional methodologies like conceptual analysis and constructive interpretation fail to resolve the equivocal nature of the concept. Instead of seeking an essentialist truth, the definition of law is more effectively determined through a practical political methodology that prioritizes the impact of legal self-understanding on political culture. A positivist framework, which maintains a strict separation between legal validity and moral merit, is preferable to non-positivism because non-positivism fosters political quietism. By associating law with inherent moral value, non-positivist theories risk weakening critical scrutiny of state power; citizens may either assume that official directives possess prima facie moral authority or view state injustice as a mere failure of the state to realize its true nature. Although this conventionalist approach implies that theoretical disagreement can leave certain legal questions indeterminate, the existence of an overlapping consensus on the core features of the concept ensures a functional legal order. Shifting the focus toward the instrumental effects of how law is conceived provides a clearer understanding of the relationship between legal authorities and the public, emphasizing the importance of maintaining a critical distance from the state’s coercive apparatus. – AI-generated abstract.

Concepts of law

Liam Murphy

Australian journal of legal philosophy, vol. 30, 2005, pp. 1–19

Abstract

The boundary between law and morality remains a central point of contention in legal philosophy, as traditional methodologies like conceptual analysis and constructive interpretation fail to resolve the equivocal nature of the concept. Instead of seeking an essentialist truth, the definition of law is more effectively determined through a practical political methodology that prioritizes the impact of legal self-understanding on political culture. A positivist framework, which maintains a strict separation between legal validity and moral merit, is preferable to non-positivism because non-positivism fosters political quietism. By associating law with inherent moral value, non-positivist theories risk weakening critical scrutiny of state power; citizens may either assume that official directives possess prima facie moral authority or view state injustice as a mere failure of the state to realize its true nature. Although this conventionalist approach implies that theoretical disagreement can leave certain legal questions indeterminate, the existence of an overlapping consensus on the core features of the concept ensures a functional legal order. Shifting the focus toward the instrumental effects of how law is conceived provides a clearer understanding of the relationship between legal authorities and the public, emphasizing the importance of maintaining a critical distance from the state’s coercive apparatus. – AI-generated abstract.

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