Vetocracy reduction and other coordination problems as potential cause areas

Abstract

There are existing but not widely known techniques from institutional economics, policy analysis and policy studies that have been effective in overcoming veto obstacles in the past.It is possible to implement such techniques in relatively non-partisan ways. That may make it politically easier to get them implemented.Examples include opt-outs and opt-ins, policy bundling, alienability, exemptions (phased or otherwise), transition periods and compensation. There are also other forms of policy design that could help.Large deadweight losses (e.g. from existing zoning rules) necessarily imply large potential benefits from reforms. Reformers can use these benefits to build a winning coalition for change.Vetocracy may become even more damaging to welfare unless we do something about it. Mitigating the problem could potentially have large benefits for welfare.Vetocracy is a subset of broader coordination problems in governance. Fixing those may have even larger benefits.