Review of MacKaye's The Logic of Language
Journal of philosophy, vol. 37, no. 8, 1940, pp. 219–220
Abstract
Intellectual clarity in philosophical and social discourse depends primarily on the rigorous analysis of the nature and function of definition. Many persistent conceptual confusions result from a systemic failure to distinguish between definitory and material propositions. By characterizing the “nature of a thing” as the conventional connotation of its name rather than an inherent ontological property, it is possible to resolve long-standing metaphysical disputes as linguistic rather than factual disagreements. This methodological approach extends to the adjudication of the realism-idealism controversy, which can be clarified by applying distinctions between personal and impersonal, as well as phenomenal and noumenal, modes of existence. While the application of this linguistic logic to mathematical systems—such as the relationship between Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries—suggests they may function as mere translations of one another, the primary value of such an inquiry lies in its capacity to facilitate intelligent communication across the fields of ethics, social theory, and natural science. Establishing these terminological foundations serves as a necessary precursor to evaluating probability and utility within a broader system of reason. – AI-generated abstract.
