The possibility of altruism

Abstract

Altruism is a rational requirement on action derived from the metaphysical conception of the self. It is not an affective state or a matter of sympathetic inclination, but a formal condition on practical reason. This requirement depends on the recognition of the reality of other persons and the capacity to regard oneself as merely one individual among many. In this framework, moral principles provide an inescapably motivating basis for action, aligning with an internalist position where ethical truths carry intrinsic motivational force. Prudence serves as a structural prototype for this analysis: just as a person is rationally required to consider their future interests because the present is merely one time among others, they are rationally required to consider the interests of others because the self is merely one person among others. The distinction between subjective and objective reasons is central to this view. Subjective reasons apply only relative to an agent’s personal standpoint, whereas objective reasons represent values that any person has reason to promote from an impersonal perspective. Rationality necessitates that subjective reasons be subsumed under objective ones to avoid motivational dissociation between personal and impersonal standpoints. Consequently, the interests of others provide direct reasons for action that do not depend on intermediate factors like self-interest or antecedent sentiments. – AI-generated abstract.