Moral luck

Abstract

Moral luck occurs when an agent can be correctly treated as an objectof moral judgment despite the fact that a significant aspect of whatshe is assessed for depends on factors beyond her control. BernardWilliams writes, “when I first introduced the expressionmoral luck, I expected to suggest an oxymoron”(Williams 1993, 251). Indeed, immunity from luck has been thought bymany to be part of the very essence of morality. And yet, as Williams(1981) and Thomas Nagel (1979) showed in their now classic pair ofarticles, it appears that our everyday judgments and practices commitus to the existence of moral luck. The problem of moral luck arisesbecause we seem to be committed to the general principle that we aremorally assessable only to the extent that what we are assessed fordepends on factors under our control (call this the “ControlPrinciple”). At the same time, when it comes to countlessparticular cases, we morally assess agents for things that depend onfactors that are not in their control. And making the situation stillmore problematic is the fact that a very natural line of reasoningsuggests that it is impossible to morally assess anyone foranything if we adhere to the Control Principle., Resultant Luck. Resultant luck is luck in the waythings turn out. Examples include the pair of would-be murderers justmentioned as well as the pair of innocent drivers described above. Inboth cases, each member of the pair has exactly the same intentions,has made the same plans, and so on, but things turn out verydifferently and so both are subject to resultant luck. If in eithercase, we can correctly offer different moral assessments for eachmember of the pair, then we have a case of resultant moralluck. Williams offers a case of “decision underuncertainty”: a somewhat fictionalized Gauguin, who chooses alife of painting in Tahiti over a life with his family, not knowingwhether he will be a great painter. In one scenario, he goes on tobecome a great painter, and in another, he fails. According toWilliams, we will judge Gauguin differently depending on the outcome.Cases of negligence provide another important kind of resultant luck.Imagine that two otherwise conscientious people have forgotten to havetheir brakes checked recently and experience brake failure, but onlyone of whom finds a child in the path of his car. If in any of thesecases we correctly offer differential moral assessments, then again wehave cases of resultant moral luck.