works
Thomas Nagel The limits of objectivity incollection Objectivity constitutes a method of understanding achieved by detaching from a particular viewpoint to form a more comprehensive, centerless conception of reality. While successful in the physical sciences, this method faces significant limitations when applied to the mind and human values. The physical conception of objectivity cannot fully accommodate the perspectival nature of conscious experience; therefore, a realistic account of reality must include subjective points of view that resist total reduction. In the domain of practical reasoning, a similar tension exists between agent-neutral values, which are recognizable from an impersonal standpoint, and agent-relative reasons, which emerge from individual autonomy and deontology. Although certain experiences like pain possess agent-neutral badness, other values remain inextricably tied to an agent’s specific projects or moral constraints against intentional harm. Because human beings are simultaneously particular persons and objective observers, a unified ethical system cannot be reached by prioritizing the most detached standpoint. Instead, a realistic meta-ethics must acknowledge the coexistence of disparate, often conflicting, reasons for action. Moral and political progress require navigating the rivalry between these internal and external perspectives rather than attempting to eliminate subjectivity entirely. – AI-generated abstract.

The limits of objectivity

Thomas Nagel

In Grethe B. Peterson (ed.) The Tanner lectures on human values, Salt Lake City, 2004, pp. 75–139

Abstract

Objectivity constitutes a method of understanding achieved by detaching from a particular viewpoint to form a more comprehensive, centerless conception of reality. While successful in the physical sciences, this method faces significant limitations when applied to the mind and human values. The physical conception of objectivity cannot fully accommodate the perspectival nature of conscious experience; therefore, a realistic account of reality must include subjective points of view that resist total reduction. In the domain of practical reasoning, a similar tension exists between agent-neutral values, which are recognizable from an impersonal standpoint, and agent-relative reasons, which emerge from individual autonomy and deontology. Although certain experiences like pain possess agent-neutral badness, other values remain inextricably tied to an agent’s specific projects or moral constraints against intentional harm. Because human beings are simultaneously particular persons and objective observers, a unified ethical system cannot be reached by prioritizing the most detached standpoint. Instead, a realistic meta-ethics must acknowledge the coexistence of disparate, often conflicting, reasons for action. Moral and political progress require navigating the rivalry between these internal and external perspectives rather than attempting to eliminate subjectivity entirely. – AI-generated abstract.

PDF

First page of PDF