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Thomas Nagel 5. Pleasure and Pain incollection Practical reasoning involves determining the proper form of generality for different kinds of value and the relationship between objective principles and individual deliberation. Physical pleasure and pain provide a foundational case for objective value, as these sensory experiences elicit involuntary responses that do not depend on prior desires or justifications. While the aversion to pain initially manifests as an agent-relative reason for action, an objective standpoint reveals that these values are also agent-neutral. The intrinsic badness of pain is recognizable from a detached perspective because the objective self cannot reasonably withhold endorsement of the sufferer’s immediate evaluative authority. Since the primitive perception of pain’s badness does not require a conception of the self, its negative value is impersonally recognized as a reason for avoidance regardless of whose sensation it is. However, the existence of such agent-neutral values does not imply that all practical reasons must be impersonal. Ethical realism must resist the temptation of overobjectification, which seeks to reduce all values to a single, maximally detached account. Instead, a comprehensive understanding of value requires exploring the inherent tension between the subjective view from within and the objective view from without, acknowledging both agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons as legitimate components of practical reasoning. – AI-generated abstract.

5. Pleasure and Pain

Thomas Nagel

In Thomas Nagel (ed.) The view from nowhere, Oxford, 1986, pp. 156–163

Abstract

Practical reasoning involves determining the proper form of generality for different kinds of value and the relationship between objective principles and individual deliberation. Physical pleasure and pain provide a foundational case for objective value, as these sensory experiences elicit involuntary responses that do not depend on prior desires or justifications. While the aversion to pain initially manifests as an agent-relative reason for action, an objective standpoint reveals that these values are also agent-neutral. The intrinsic badness of pain is recognizable from a detached perspective because the objective self cannot reasonably withhold endorsement of the sufferer’s immediate evaluative authority. Since the primitive perception of pain’s badness does not require a conception of the self, its negative value is impersonally recognized as a reason for avoidance regardless of whose sensation it is. However, the existence of such agent-neutral values does not imply that all practical reasons must be impersonal. Ethical realism must resist the temptation of overobjectification, which seeks to reduce all values to a single, maximally detached account. Instead, a comprehensive understanding of value requires exploring the inherent tension between the subjective view from within and the objective view from without, acknowledging both agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons as legitimate components of practical reasoning. – AI-generated abstract.

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