Equality and partiality
Oxford, 1991
Abstract
This essay explores the central problem of political theory: reconciling the standpoint of the collectivity with the standpoint of the individual. It begins by arguing that the ethical basis of political theory stems from a division within each individual between the personal and impersonal standpoints. The former represents individual desires, interests, and projects, while the latter represents the claims of the collectivity, producing a powerful demand for universal impartiality and equality. The author argues that the search for a political ideal requires an acceptable integration of these two standpoints, noting that the problem of designing institutions that do justice to the equal importance of all persons without making unacceptable demands on individuals has not been solved. The essay goes on to consider the problem of utopianism, arguing that a political theory is Utopian in the pejorative sense if it describes a form of collective life that humans could not lead through any feasible process of social and mental development. A non-utopian solution requires a proper balance between the ideal and persuasive functions of political theory, demanding both impersonal and personal justification. The author explores the concept of political legitimacy, arguing that its ideal is that the use of state power should be capable of being authorized by each citizen, ultimately requiring unanimous agreement on basic principles and institutions. The essay concludes that a harmonious combination of an acceptable political ideal and acceptable standards of personal morality is difficult to achieve, arguing that the problem of designing institutions that do justice to the equal importance of all persons without making unacceptable demands on individuals remains unsolved. – AI-generated abstract.
Quotes from this work
It is clear that the power of complex modern states depends on the deeply ingrained tendency of most of their members to follow the rules, obey the laws, and do what is expected of them by the established authorities without deciding case by case whether they agree with what is being done. We turn ourselves easily into instruments of higher-order processes; the complex organizational hierarchies typical of modern life could not function otherwise—not only armies, but all bureaucratic institutions rely on such psychological dispositions.
This gives rise to what can be called the German problem. The generally valuable tendency to conform, not to break ranks conspicuously, not to attract attention to oneself, and to do one’s job and obey official instructions without substituting one’s own personal judgment can be put to the service of monstrous ends, and can maintain in power the most appalling regimes. The same procedural correctness that inhibits people from taking bribes may also turn them into obedient participants in well-organized official policies of segregation, deportation, and genocidal extermination. The problem is whether it is possible to have the benefits of conformity and bureaucratic obedience without the dangers.