Why is there anything?
In Thomas Nagel (ed.) Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament: Essays 2002-2008, New York, 2010, pp. 27–31
Abstract
The inquiry into why something exists rather than nothing is fundamentally ill-formed, as the concept of absolute nothingness represents a linguistic transgression rather than an intelligible possibility. Traditional theological and metaphysical attempts to address this question fail by detaching concepts such as agency, cause, and existence from the spatio-temporal conditions that provide their meaning. A non-physical, non-temporal entity cannot function as an explanatory cause, as the conceptual requirements for agency involve physical action within an already existing world. Furthermore, the notion of absolute nothingness is logically incoherent; in intelligible discourse, “nothing” denotes the absence of specific contents within a state of affairs, not the absence of any state of affairs whatsoever. Because meaningful descriptions of reality presuppose a material context, matter must be regarded as a necessary existence. While scientific cosmology explains transitions within the universe, it cannot address the existence of the universe as a whole; however, this lack of a causal explanation does not validate transcendental alternatives. Instead, the persistence of the “why” question reflects an impulse to use language beyond its inherent limits, treating the impossibility of anything existing as if it were a conceivable alternative. – AI-generated abstract.