On the survival of mankind
In Robert Elliot and Arran Gare (eds.) Environmental philosophy, 1983, pp. 40–57
Abstract
The moral status of the survival of the human species rests on whether there exists a fundamental obligation to ensure its long-term perpetuation or the maximization of total human lives over time. Within ethical frameworks such as contractualism and libertarianism, no such obligation can be established because future, non-existent entities cannot participate in social contracts or possess rights that constrain contemporary actions. Utilitarianism provides a more complex perspective, yet it remains divided between totalizing views that seek to maximize aggregate happiness by increasing the population and person-affecting views that limit moral consideration to those who will actually exist. Under the latter, there is no duty to bring new individuals into being simply to prolong the species. Species survival is more accurately characterized as a collective human interest rather than an intrinsic moral requirement. Consequently, coercive measures, including eugenic programs aimed at preventing extinction or improving the genetic stock for the sake of survival, lack a sufficient moral foundation. Such interventions represent unjustifiable violations of individual liberty, as the preservation of the species does not constitute an overriding ethical mandate. Survival is instead sustained by the voluntary reproductive choices of individuals and their shared desire for a future. Because there is no formal obligation to promote the survival of the species, policies that mandate genetic selection or reproductive control for this purpose are ethically illegitimate. – AI-generated abstract.
