UK Government’s approach to emerging infectious diseases and bioweapons

Abstract

The increasing accessibility and power of biotechnology, alongside natural and accidental threats, pose evolving biosecurity risks requiring a comprehensive UK strategy. Dual-use research, pathogen manipulation, and inadequate cyberbiosecurity oversight necessitate improved risk monitoring, assessment, and governance. While the 2018 UK Biosecurity Strategy provides a foundation, critical gaps exist regarding emerging technological intersections, Brexit-related vulnerabilities, and dual-use research oversight. Leveraging the UK’s robust bioeconomy through public-private partnerships, enhanced biosurveillance tools, and horizon scanning can strengthen preparedness. Four recommendations are proposed: appointing a liaison between bioscience and security communities; assigning ministerial responsibility for dual-use research and technology; forming a Biosecurity Leadership Council for stakeholder engagement and policy guidance; and establishing a National Centre for Biosecurity and Biosafety to drive positive cultural change and resource development across sectors. These integrated measures are crucial for mitigating biosecurity risks and promoting responsible innovation within the UK. – AI-generated abstract.