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Yew-Kwang Ng Welfarism: a defence against Sen's attack article Social welfare is properly defined as a function exclusively of individual welfares, a position that withstands critiques based on non-utility information or conflicting moral principles. While objective indicators like income equality are frequently utilized in social decision-making, they typically serve as instrumental proxies for individual welfare under conditions of imperfect information rather than as independent evaluative criteria. Moral principles such as the prohibition of torture or the protection of personal liberty, while persuasive, function as non-basic value judgments derived from long-term welfarist considerations. These principles are maintained because their consistent application prevents detrimental effects on attitude formation and social harmony, which would otherwise diminish aggregate welfare over time. Even the conceptualization of human rights is fundamentally rooted in the capacity of sentients to experience pleasure and pain, distinguishing them from non-sentient objects. Therefore, apparent conflicts between welfarism and moral rules are resolved by recognizing that such rules are secondary heuristics designed to maximize welfare in all practically possible circumstances. Philosophically, welfarism remains the primary evaluative standard, with rights and principles serving as essential but subordinate instruments for its achievement. – AI-generated abstract.

Welfarism: a defence against Sen's attack

Yew-Kwang Ng

The economic journal, vol. 91, no. 362, 1981, pp. 527

Abstract

Social welfare is properly defined as a function exclusively of individual welfares, a position that withstands critiques based on non-utility information or conflicting moral principles. While objective indicators like income equality are frequently utilized in social decision-making, they typically serve as instrumental proxies for individual welfare under conditions of imperfect information rather than as independent evaluative criteria. Moral principles such as the prohibition of torture or the protection of personal liberty, while persuasive, function as non-basic value judgments derived from long-term welfarist considerations. These principles are maintained because their consistent application prevents detrimental effects on attitude formation and social harmony, which would otherwise diminish aggregate welfare over time. Even the conceptualization of human rights is fundamentally rooted in the capacity of sentients to experience pleasure and pain, distinguishing them from non-sentient objects. Therefore, apparent conflicts between welfarism and moral rules are resolved by recognizing that such rules are secondary heuristics designed to maximize welfare in all practically possible circumstances. Philosophically, welfarism remains the primary evaluative standard, with rights and principles serving as essential but subordinate instruments for its achievement. – AI-generated abstract.

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