A case for happiness, cardinalism, and interpersonal comparability
The economic journal, vol. 107, no. 445, 1997, pp. 1848–1858
Abstract
Happiness is more important than the more objective concepts of choice, preference and income. Cardinal notions of utility should be considered.Modern economists are strongly biased in favor of preference, ordinalism and against personal comparison. The opposite is argued. The proposed change in perspective has important conceptual and policy significance, as also evidenced in the papers by Frank (1997) and Oswald (1997) that are strongly endorsed.
Quotes from this work
I have also no difficulties saying that my welfare level is positive, zero, or negative. When I am neither enjoying nor suffering, my welfare is zero. Thus, the value of my welfare is a fully cardinal quantity unique up to a proportionate transformation. I am also sure that I am not bestowed by God or evolution to have this special ability of perceiving the full cardinality (both intensity and the origin) of both my welfare and preference levels. In fact, from my daily experience, observation, and conversation, I know that all people (including ordinalist economists) have this ability, except that economists heavily brainwashed by ordinalism deny it despite actually possessing it. This denial is quite incredible. If your preference is really purely ordinal, you can only say that you prefer your present situation (A) to that plus an ant bite (B) and also prefer the latter to being bodily thrown into a pool of sulphuric acid (C). You cannot say that your preference of A over B is less than your preference of B over C. Can you really believe that!