Happiness, life satisfaction, or subjective well-being? A measurement and moral philosophical perspective

Abstract

While not denying the usefulness of different concepts like life satisfaction and subjective well-being, this paper argues that happiness should be preferred in most cases, particularly with respect to what individuals and the society should really be interested in ultimately. Life satisfaction is more liable to a shift in the aspiration level, reducing the comparability of the resulting indices. Life satisfaction and/or preference may also differ from happiness due to a concern for the happiness of others. A moral philosophical argument in favour of happiness as the only rational ultimate objective is given. All proposed qualifications to this principle can be explained by the effects on the happiness in the future or of others (hence really no qualification) or that their apparent acceptability is due to our imperfect rationality. Simple ways to improve the accuracy and interpersonal and intertemporal comparability of happiness measurement include using happiness instead of life satisfaction (or other concepts), pinning down the dividing line of the zero amount of net happiness, using an interpersonally valid unit based on the just perceivable increment of happiness, and the complementary use of this method for small samples and the traditional methods for large samples.