Moral responsibility and determinism: the cognitive science of folk intuitions

Abstract

The apparent deadlock between compatibilist and incompatibilist views on moral responsibility is rooted in the distinct psychological processes that generate folk intuitions. Experimental evidence indicates that human judgment shifts significantly depending on whether a scenario is presented in an abstract or a concrete, affect-laden manner. In abstract contexts that trigger theoretical cognition, individuals typically provide incompatibilist responses, maintaining that responsibility is impossible in a deterministic universe. In contrast, concrete scenarios involving vivid moral transgressions trigger affective mechanisms that lead to compatibilist judgments, even when determinism is explicitly stipulated. This divergence suggests that affect plays a pivotal role in responsibility attribution, either by biasing an underlying incompatibilist theory—functioning as a performance error—or by serving as a fundamental component of moral competence. Because high-affect cases elicit greater attributions of responsibility than low-affect cases regardless of concreteness, the tension between these competing intuitions explains the persistence of the philosophical debate. Both positions draw upon different aspects of human cognitive architecture, leaving the folk concept of responsibility internally conflicted. – AI-generated abstract.