Is Value Under Hypothesis Value?

Abstract

The “Value Under Hypotheses is Value” (VUV) thesis posits that an agent uncertain about which value function is correct ought to assign to an alternative, under the hypothesis that its value is $x$, precisely the value $x$. While this thesis holds in certain contexts, such as surrogate decision-making for another individual, it fails in choices involving transformative experiences and moral uncertainty. Introducing scenarios in which agents can acquire information reveals a foundational dilemma: adherence to the VUV thesis entails either a violation of the standard decision-theoretic axiom of Dominance or the evaluation of outcomes in a manner completely insensitive to their first-order properties. In transformative choices, avoiding dominance violations requires evaluating outcomes solely on the basis of whether a future metaphysical self approves of them, resulting in unauthentic decision-making. Under moral uncertainty, avoiding dominance violations necessitates acting purely from a de dicto moral motivation rather than responding to the first-order features that ground moral value. Consequently, the general demand of practical rationality to maximize expected utility cannot be extended to maximizing the expectation of an uncertain value function without imposing severe and problematic normative commitments. – AI-generated abstract.