Intrinsicalism and conditionalism about final value

Abstract

Given the plausible assumption that there is an intimate tie between final values and appropriate attitudinal responses, it appears that conditionalism is the better approach for mainly the following three reasons: First, intrinsicalism is too indiscriminate, which makes it subject to what I call ’location problems’ of final value. I illustrate this problem by discussing alleged examples of Moorean organic unities. Second, intrinsicalism evokes symptoms alleged examples of Moorean organic unities. Second, intrinsicalism evokes symptoms of ’evaluative schizophrenia’. Third, considerations of theoretical economy tell in favor of conditionalism. Thereafter, I respond to some recent challenges to conditionalism. An appendix surveys some meritorious implications that conditionalism offers for various substantial versions of such structurally different views about value as monism, pluralism, and particularism. (edited)