On "The importance of self-identity"
Journal of philosophy, vol. 68, no. 20, 1971, pp. 683–690
Abstract
I discuss penelhum’s paper, In the same issue. We are sometimes indifferent about, Or ‘do not identify with’, Ourselves at another time. I suggest that, On one view about our lives, Such indifference may be justified. According to this view, What is most important in the continued existence of a person are various psychological connections, Most of which can hold to different degrees. If our ground for not identifying with ourselves at some other time is the weakness of the connections between ourselves now and ourselves then, Our attitude may seem defensible. It can also be expressed by talk about successive selves, Which I next discuss. I end with the claim that a certain form of ‘resurrection’, Though it does not involve continuity of the body, Should be thought to be as good as survival.
Notes citing this work
Quotes from this work
Take a Swede who is proud of his country’s peaceful record. He might have a similar divided attitude. He may not be disturbed by the thought that Sweden once fought aggressive wars; but if she had recently fought such wars he would be greatly disturbed. Someone might say, “This man’s attitude is indefensible. The wars of Gustavus, or of Karl XII, are as much part of Swedish history.” This truth cannot, I think, support this criticism. Modern Sweden is indeed continuous with the aggressive Sweden of the Vasa kings. But the connections are weak enough to justify this man’s attitude.