Later selves and moral principles

Abstract

Personal identity consists in psychological and physical continuity rather than a further, indivisible fact. Because these continuities are matters of degree, the moral weight of identity varies according to the strength of psychological connections between an individual at different points in time. Reduced connectedness justifies diminishing the scope of moral desert and the binding nature of past commitments, as a later self may be viewed as distinct from an earlier self who committed a crime or made a promise. Beyond specific cases of weak connection, this reductionist view of personhood alters the foundations of distributive justice. If the unity of an individual life is less deep than traditionally assumed, the moral boundary between persons carries less significance. This shift supports utilitarian frameworks by minimizing the distinction between balancing benefits and burdens within a single life and doing so across multiple lives. By focusing on the quality of experiences rather than the persistence of the subjects who have them, this perspective treats the distribution of well-being as a secondary concern to the maximization of total utility. The boundaries between persons are thus viewed as less morally decisive, analogous to the divisions between successive stages of a nation’s history. – AI-generated abstract.