Is common-sense morality self-defeating?
Journal of philosophy, vol. 76, no. 10, 1979, pp. 533–545
Abstract
Moral theories are self-defeating when successful adherence to their prescriptions results in the inferior achievement of the specific aims they establish. While agent-neutral theories like act consequentialism avoid direct self-defeat by definition, agent-relative theories—which assign distinct duties to individuals based on their specific relationships or roles—can be directly collectively self-defeating. In many-person coordination problems, such as those involving public goods or parental obligations, individuals who successfully prioritize their own charges often cause the aims of every agent to be less realized than if a different collective strategy were adopted. This structural failure in common-sense morality indicates that ideal act theory requires a revision: agents should perform those actions that would best achieve their substantive moral aims if followed by all. Such a revision addresses the discrepancy between individual rational obedience and collective outcome without necessitating a wholesale move to pure consequentialism. Although the formal aim of avoiding wrongdoing remains central, the substantive failure of a theory to satisfy its own criteria under conditions of universal compliance functions as a significant internal critique of agent-relative moral frameworks. – AI-generated abstract.