Energy policy and the further future: the identity problem

Abstract

Moral obligations to the further future are complicated by the fact that large-scale social and energy policies inevitably alter the identity of future persons. Because the specific timing of conception determines which individual is born, a choice between different policies over several centuries results in entirely different populations. Consequently, future individuals who suffer the negative effects of a risky policy cannot be said to have been harmed by that choice, provided their lives are worth living, as they would otherwise never have existed. This non-identity problem challenges the person-affecting principle, which holds that an act is wrong only if it is worse for a specific victim. To maintain that long-term environmental depletion or risky energy choices are morally objectionable, ethical theory must shift toward principles that compare the quality of life across different possible populations. Such a framework suggests it is bad if the people who live are worse off than the different people who could have lived in their place, even if the choice is worse for no one. This implies that the fundamental principles of welfare-based morality are not necessarily person-affecting, requiring a revision of moral theories that rely solely on individual interests to justify obligations to future generations. – AI-generated abstract.