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Abstract

Reductionist accounts of personal identity demonstrate that the continued existence of persons consists solely in psychological and physical connections rather than a deep, further fact. This metaphysical reality implies that the rationality of attitudes toward time and identity depends on the nature of these connections rather than the consequentialist effects of holding such attitudes. In moral philosophy, the reductionist view undermines traditional principles of desert and distributive justice by suggesting that compensation across different moments of a single life is as problematic as compensation across different persons. Consequently, the “separateness of persons” extends to the intertemporal stages of a life. The self-interest theory is insufficient because self-interest is not a uniquely supreme rational aim, lending support to the present-aim theory of rationality. Furthermore, acts with imperceptible individual effects are morally significant when they belong to sets of actions that collectively cause perceptible harm. Common-sense morality, particularly concerning special obligations to related individuals, is often directly collectively self-defeating and requires revision to ensure better outcomes for all involved. Finally, the non-identity problem demonstrates that moral objections to choices affecting future generations cannot rely solely on person-affecting interests or rights-based claims, necessitating a new theoretical framework for beneficence. – AI-generated abstract.