A reply to Sterba

Abstract

The person-affecting restriction, which posits that an act cannot be wrong if it is not bad for any person who ever lives, provides a theoretical basis for the asymmetry view in population ethics. While critics suggest this restriction merely restates the asymmetry it intends to explain, the principle finds independent grounding in contractualist and rationalist moral theories. Such frameworks, including those based on interpersonal justification or the existence of a complainant, suggest that moral wrongness necessitates a victim. However, maintaining this restriction proves tenable only if it can address the Paradox of Future Individuals. Because the person-affecting restriction makes it impossible to solve this paradox, its essential premises must be abandoned or revised. The pursuit of a viable moral theory requires identifying an explanation for the asymmetry that avoids the Repugnant Conclusion without collapsing into a symmetry view that treats the creation of happy lives as a moral requirement. Theoretical efforts should focus on reconciling the intuitive plausibility of the asymmetry with the moral standing of future generations who are not yet actual. – AI-generated abstract.