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Derek Parfit A response incollection Personal identity consists solely in physical and psychological connections rather than a deep, irreducible “further fact” of existence. While common intuition suggests that continued existence is a binary state that is either wholly present or absent, this belief is undermined by thought experiments involving teletransportation and replication. In cases such as the “Branch-Line Case,” where an individual coexists with a psychologically continuous replica, the prospect of the original’s death is functionally equivalent to ordinary survival. Rational concern should therefore be directed toward the preservation of psychological connections—such as memory and character—rather than the preservation of a metaphysical ego. Adopting this reductionist framework necessitates a reassessment of the significance of mortality and the foundations of moral responsibility. If identity is merely a matter of degree and connection, traditional notions of desert and guilt lose their metaphysical grounding, as there is no persistent subject beyond these connections to whom such attributes can be uniquely tethered. Consequently, the distinction between the self and a sufficiently similar successor becomes an empty question, requiring a revision of both emotional attitudes toward the future and ethical principles regarding individual accountability. – AI-generated abstract.

A response

Derek Parfit

In A. R. Peacocke and Grant Gillett (eds.) Persons and personality: a contemporary inquiry, Oxford, 1987, pp. 88–98

Abstract

Personal identity consists solely in physical and psychological connections rather than a deep, irreducible “further fact” of existence. While common intuition suggests that continued existence is a binary state that is either wholly present or absent, this belief is undermined by thought experiments involving teletransportation and replication. In cases such as the “Branch-Line Case,” where an individual coexists with a psychologically continuous replica, the prospect of the original’s death is functionally equivalent to ordinary survival. Rational concern should therefore be directed toward the preservation of psychological connections—such as memory and character—rather than the preservation of a metaphysical ego. Adopting this reductionist framework necessitates a reassessment of the significance of mortality and the foundations of moral responsibility. If identity is merely a matter of degree and connection, traditional notions of desert and guilt lose their metaphysical grounding, as there is no persistent subject beyond these connections to whom such attributes can be uniquely tethered. Consequently, the distinction between the self and a sufficiently similar successor becomes an empty question, requiring a revision of both emotional attitudes toward the future and ethical principles regarding individual accountability. – AI-generated abstract.

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