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Derek Parfit Who do you think you are? article Personal identity consists not in a singular, metaphysical fact, but in the persistence of physical and psychological continuities. The common belief that identity is an absolute, all-or-nothing condition is an illusion supported by emotional significance and linguistic conventions. Through thought experiments involving brain division and transplantation, it becomes evident that identity is often a conceptual or verbal matter rather than a discovery of an underlying deep fact. In cases of division, where two resulting persons share identical psychological connections to a predecessor, identity is technically lost because one individual cannot be two. However, because the psychological continuities are preserved, nothing of value in survival is actually lost. Survival, therefore, does not strictly require identity; instead, it depends on the preservation of certain psychological relations. Recognizing this reductionist perspective diminishes the egoistic concern for the future self as a unique, persistent entity. Consequently, the traditional significance of death is re-evaluated, as the continued existence of one’s thoughts and experiences becomes more relevant than the persistence of a single, unified “I.” This shift in understanding challenges conventional frameworks of self-interest and moral concern. – AI-generated abstract.

Who do you think you are?

Derek Parfit

Times higher education supplement, 1992, pp. 19–20

Abstract

Personal identity consists not in a singular, metaphysical fact, but in the persistence of physical and psychological continuities. The common belief that identity is an absolute, all-or-nothing condition is an illusion supported by emotional significance and linguistic conventions. Through thought experiments involving brain division and transplantation, it becomes evident that identity is often a conceptual or verbal matter rather than a discovery of an underlying deep fact. In cases of division, where two resulting persons share identical psychological connections to a predecessor, identity is technically lost because one individual cannot be two. However, because the psychological continuities are preserved, nothing of value in survival is actually lost. Survival, therefore, does not strictly require identity; instead, it depends on the preservation of certain psychological relations. Recognizing this reductionist perspective diminishes the egoistic concern for the future self as a unique, persistent entity. Consequently, the traditional significance of death is re-evaluated, as the continued existence of one’s thoughts and experiences becomes more relevant than the persistence of a single, unified “I.” This shift in understanding challenges conventional frameworks of self-interest and moral concern. – AI-generated abstract.

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