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Derek Parfit Paul Seabright: Pluralism and the standard of living incollection A narrow, contractualist definition of the standard of living, restricted to rights over physical commodities and verifiable services, fails to encompass essential dimensions of human flourishing. The premise that state intervention is limited to matters capable of being subject to a hypothetical social contract often relies on a strict requirement for public verifiability, akin to the standards of private insurance schemes. However, this restriction is misplaced in the context of public planning and policy, where qualitative evidence regarding comfort, dignity, and aesthetic value remains relevant even without the precise standards required for legal enforcement. Furthermore, valuing goods and services based on the cost of their provision is insufficient, as the standard of living is fundamentally tied to the outcomes resources facilitate rather than the mere command over those resources. Disparities in physical ability, for instance, demonstrate that equal command over commodities does not equate to an equal standard of living. Finally, the integration of pluralism into economic policy does not necessitate a restricted view of well-being; a social theory can accommodate divergent views of the good life while still accounting for the indirect ways in which social structures and services enhance individual functioning and flourishing. – AI-generated abstract.

Paul Seabright: Pluralism and the standard of living

Derek Parfit

In Martha Nussbaum and Amartya K. Sen (eds.) The Quality of Life, New York, 1993, pp. 410–417

Abstract

A narrow, contractualist definition of the standard of living, restricted to rights over physical commodities and verifiable services, fails to encompass essential dimensions of human flourishing. The premise that state intervention is limited to matters capable of being subject to a hypothetical social contract often relies on a strict requirement for public verifiability, akin to the standards of private insurance schemes. However, this restriction is misplaced in the context of public planning and policy, where qualitative evidence regarding comfort, dignity, and aesthetic value remains relevant even without the precise standards required for legal enforcement. Furthermore, valuing goods and services based on the cost of their provision is insufficient, as the standard of living is fundamentally tied to the outcomes resources facilitate rather than the mere command over those resources. Disparities in physical ability, for instance, demonstrate that equal command over commodities does not equate to an equal standard of living. Finally, the integration of pluralism into economic policy does not necessitate a restricted view of well-being; a social theory can accommodate divergent views of the good life while still accounting for the indirect ways in which social structures and services enhance individual functioning and flourishing. – AI-generated abstract.

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