Why anything? Why this?
London Review of Books, vol. 20, no. 2, 1998, pp. 24–27
Abstract
The existence of the Universe and its specific physical configuration pose questions that cannot be satisfied by causal explanations, as any such account necessarily leaves its own starting conditions unexplained. The apparent fine-tuning of the early Universe for complexity and life suggests that the actualization of our specific world is statistically improbable, necessitating a choice between theistic design, the Many Worlds Hypothesis, or a fundamental explanatory law. Beyond local causality, reality must be understood through competing cosmic possibilities: the Null Possibility (nothingness), the All Worlds Hypothesis (maximality), and various intermediate states. While the Null Possibility is the simplest and least arbitrary, its failure to obtain points toward the existence of a highest law. Such a law may be axiarchic, asserting that reality exists because it is good, or based on other special features like mathematical beauty or ontological fullness. These frameworks suggest that the Universe obtains not by chance or through a first cause, but because it satisfies a particular meta-principle that distinguishes the actual from the merely possible. – AI-generated abstract.
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We should not expect simplicity at both the factual and explanatory levels. If there is no Selector, we should not expect that there would also be no Universe.