Experiences, subjects, and conceptual schemes

Abstract

Personal identity consists in physical and psychological continuity rather than the existence of an ultimate, simple substance. Beliefs regarding the absolute determinacy of identity are often unfounded, as identity can be indeterminate in cases where questions about survival are merely about different descriptions of the same underlying facts. Although critics maintain that experiences necessarily require a subject, this requirement does not imply a Cartesian Ego; subjects are more accurately understood as composite entities constituted by bodies and interrelated mental processes. A coherent, impersonal conceptual scheme—one that describes reality in terms of sequences of experiences without the concept of a persisting subject—is metaphysically viable and no less accurate than a person-involving scheme. Split-brain phenomena further suggest that the unity of consciousness is better explained by psychological connections than by the existence of a singular subject. While the concept of a person is central to human moral and rational frameworks, it is not a metaphysical necessity for individuating experiences or describing the flow of consciousness. Recognizing the reductionist nature of persons suggests that identity itself lacks the rational or moral importance often attributed to it, and that psychological continuity remains the more significant relation. – AI-generated abstract.