Rationality and reasons
In Dan Egonsson et al. (ed.) Exploring practical philosophy: from action to values, Aldershot, 2001, pp. 17–39
Abstract
There are many kinds of normative reason, such as reasons for believing, for caring, and for acting. Reasons are provided by facts, such as the fact that someone’s finger-prints are on some gun, or that calling an ambulance might save someone’s life. According to desire-based theories, practical reasons are all provided by our desires, or aims. According to value-based theories, these reasons are provided by facts about what is relevantly good, or worth achieving. Desire-based theories are the ones that are most widely accepted. In economics and the other social sciences, rationality is often defined in a desirebased way. According to desire-based theories, in their only normative form: Some acts really are rational.
