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Derek Parfit Overpopulation and the quality of life incollection The evaluation of population growth necessitates a choice between maximizing the average quality of life or the total sum of happiness. Adopting the total principle—which values any additional life that is worth living—leads to the Repugnant Conclusion: a vast population with lives barely worth living is judged superior to a smaller population enjoying a very high quality of life. This conclusion is logically supported by the mere addition paradox, which suggests that adding individuals with lives worth living to a population does not make an outcome worse. If subsequent redistributions of resources improve the lives of the worse-off more than they diminish the lives of the better-off, the resulting state appears better than the original, eventually leading by transitive steps to a massive population with minimal well-being. Avoiding this result requires rejecting the assumption that all increases in the quantity of happiness can offset a loss in quality. A potential solution lies in perfectionism, which posits that certain high-level goods, such as complex creative and aesthetic experiences, possess a qualitative value that is incommensurable with any quantity of lower-level pleasures. By establishing that the “best things in life” cannot be replaced by any volume of marginally worthwhile existence, the trade-offs that drive the Repugnant Conclusion are rendered invalid. – AI-generated abstract.

Overpopulation and the quality of life

Derek Parfit

In Peter Singer (ed.) Applied ethics, Oxford, 1986, pp. 145–164

Abstract

The evaluation of population growth necessitates a choice between maximizing the average quality of life or the total sum of happiness. Adopting the total principle—which values any additional life that is worth living—leads to the Repugnant Conclusion: a vast population with lives barely worth living is judged superior to a smaller population enjoying a very high quality of life. This conclusion is logically supported by the mere addition paradox, which suggests that adding individuals with lives worth living to a population does not make an outcome worse. If subsequent redistributions of resources improve the lives of the worse-off more than they diminish the lives of the better-off, the resulting state appears better than the original, eventually leading by transitive steps to a massive population with minimal well-being. Avoiding this result requires rejecting the assumption that all increases in the quantity of happiness can offset a loss in quality. A potential solution lies in perfectionism, which posits that certain high-level goods, such as complex creative and aesthetic experiences, possess a qualitative value that is incommensurable with any quantity of lower-level pleasures. By establishing that the “best things in life” cannot be replaced by any volume of marginally worthwhile existence, the trade-offs that drive the Repugnant Conclusion are rendered invalid. – AI-generated abstract.

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