Postcript

Abstract

Formulating coherent moral theories for scenarios involving varying population sizes presents substantial challenges, casting doubt on the reliability of ethical frameworks in more conventional contexts. These include cases where population size remains constant but identities differ, as well as cases involving the same group of individuals. However, a rigorous distinction between these three types of scenarios offers a potential path for isolating theoretical inconsistencies. By quarantining the impossibility and subsequent skepticism to different-number choices, it may be possible to preserve the utility of ethical theories in same-number and same-people cases. This methodological approach parallels the treatment of infinite utilities in welfarism; although welfarist theories struggle to accommodate infinite quantities of suffering or happiness, such limitations do not inherently invalidate their application to finite outcomes. Consequently, the difficulties encountered in population ethics might be viewed as specific to certain demographic complexities rather than as a universal refutation of moral reasoning. – AI-generated abstract.