What we could rationally will

Abstract

The moral requirement to treat others as ends-in-themselves is best understood through a Rational Consent Principle, which posits that an action is permissible only if the affected parties could rationally consent to it. For this principle to function, rationality must be grounded in a wide value-based theory of reasons rather than subjective desires or mere self-interest. Although traditional formulations of the Kantian categorical imperative fail to adequately condemn structural inequities like racism or exploitation, a revised Kantian Contractualist Formula identifies right actions as those permitted by principles whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will. When agents acknowledge both personal reasons and the force of impartial reasons, the set of principles that everyone could rationally choose converges with those supported by Rule Consequentialism. Under this framework, the principles whose general adoption yields the best impartial outcomes are the same principles that individuals would choose in a contractualist thought experiment. This convergence indicates that Kantianism, contractualism, and consequentialism are not necessarily competing frameworks but are complementary theories that point toward a unified normative conclusion centered on impartially optimal outcomes. – AI-generated abstract.