Kant's arguments for his formula of universal law

Abstract

Kant’s derivation of the Formula of Universal Law relies on a taxonomy of imperatives that fails to account for categorical teleological principles. By defining categorical imperatives as those representing actions as necessary without reference to an end, Kant overlooks objective ends required by reason independently of subjective desire. The distinction between formal and material principles involves distinct normative and motivational dimensions; specifically, Kant conflates the requirement that a principle apply regardless of desire with the requirement that it impose only a structural constraint on maxims. This conflation leads to the erroneous conclusion that any unconditional moral law must lack substantive content. In Groundwork 1 and 2, the transition from acting “from duty” to the Formula of Universal Law is logically invalid because it assumes that if a motive excludes inclination, the remaining principle must be the mere form of lawfulness. This oversight excludes substantive deontological or teleological principles that are equally independent of subjective inclination. While the original arguments for the Formula are unsound, the principle remains a plausible foundation for contractualist ethics if appropriately revised. – AI-generated abstract.